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Abstract— As control systems become increasingly more
complex, there exists a pressing need to find systematic ways
of verifying them. To address this concern, there has been
significant work in developing test generation schemes for
black-box control architectures. These schemes test a black-
box control architecture’s ability to satisfy its control objectives,
when these objectives are expressed as operational specifications
through temporal logic formulae. Our work extends these prior,
model based results by lower bounding the probability by which
the black-box system will satisfy its operational specification,
when subject to a pre-specified set of environmental phenomena.
We do so by systematically generating tests to minimize a
Lipschitz continuous robustness measure for the operational
specification. We demonstrate our method with experimental
results, wherein we show that our framework can reasonably
lower bound the probability of specification satisfaction.
I. INTRODUCTION
An integral aspect of control system design is to ensure
that the driven system satisfies some extraneous criteria, e.g.
safety, robustness to noise/model mismatch, etc. To quantify
this assurance, these criteria are oftentimes expressed as
temporal logic formulae, and the development of controllers
which are guaranteed to satisfy these formulae - termed
correct-by-construction controllers - have seen significant
interest in the recent past [2], [3]. However, as control
systems become increasingly more complex and are subject
to more diverse, varied scenarios, developing a correct-by-
construction controller becomes progressively more difficult,
if not, perhaps, impossible [4]. As a result, the problem re-
mains, as to how to verify that a complex control architecture
satisfies the criteria required of it.
In the Test and Evaluation (T&E) community, significant
work has been done to address this verification dilemma.
Specifically, there has been some work to extend tradi-
tional safety verification techniques, by iteratively solving for
candidate Lyapunov/Barrier certificates based on simulation
data/a dynamic model [5]–[7]. However, the ideal would be
to verify the controller’s ability to satisfy its criteria despite
the presence of confounding environmental phenomena, as
these oftentimes lead to a system’s inability to satisfy speci-
fications e.g. unpredictable human behavior for autonomous
cars and adversarial agents in a reconnaissance context [4].
Numerous, model-based approaches to testing for verifi-
cation have been studied by the T&E community [8]–[10];
however, they tend to be sample inefficient. As a result, there
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Fig. 1. This paper presents a method to lower bound the probability
with which a black-box system (the Segway shown top left) satisfies its
operational specification (please see Figures 2 and 3 for the full experimental
setup). This method first determines the worst-case robustness measure, h∗,
for a system simulator, and uses this h∗ and a norm-bound, , from the
signal tube, to lower bound the worst-case robustness for the black-box
system, to some minimum probability.
has also been significant work in increasing sample efficiency
of these methods [11], [12]. One such sample efficient
method is Bayesian Optimization, which has seen success
in terms of fine tuning existing control strategies [13], [14].
From a testing perspective, identifying environmental phe-
nomena to frustrate satisfaction of the system’s operational
specifications can also be recast to a minimization problem
solvable by Bayesian Optimization [15]. Indeed, there has
also been work to identify multiple such phenomena, should
they exist [16].
Our Contribution We extend prior results in the Bayesian
testing community, by lower bounding the probability with
which the actual system satisfies its operational specifica-
tions. We do so for Reach-Avoid type STL specifications,
as they permit a Lipschitz continuous robustness measure.
As a result, the testing for verification problem can be
reformulated as an optimization problem that is solvable by
Bayesian Optimization - minimizing this robustness measure
subject to an adversarial environment. Finally, we use the
solution to this minimization problem to lower bound the
probability by which the true system satisfies the same
operational specification.
Outline in Section II-A, we provide a brief mathematical
overview of relevant topics. Section II-B formally sets up the
problem under study. Section III-A details the main theorem
and its proof, and Section III-B states and proves three
propositions generalizing the theorem. Finally, Section IV
shows how our method provides a reasonable lower bound on
the probability that a Segway satisfies its safety specification,
by verifying its associated controller.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section details the necessary mathematical informa-
tion for the sequel and frames the problem under study.
A. Mathematical Preliminaries
This subsection will be split into three parts encompassing
some general notation, a brief description on Signal Temporal
Logic, and a brief description of Bayesian Optimization.
Notation: Rd denotes the d-dimensional Euclidean Space.
A function, f : X → Y, is (L, ‖ · ‖X, ‖ · ‖Y)-Lipschitz
continuous, if there exists a positive constant, L, such that:
‖f(x)− f(y)‖Y ≤ L‖x− y‖X ∀ x, y ∈ X, where ‖ · ‖X and
‖ · ‖Y are norms for the normed vector spaces, X and Y,
respectively. A signal is a function, s : R+ → X, that maps
time to a vector in a vector space, X, i.e. s(t) = x ∈ X.
SXtf is the vector space of all signals over the bounded time-
frame, [0, tf ], i.e. SXtf = {s : R+ → X | ∃ x ∈ X s. t. s(t) =
x ∀ t ∈ [0, tf ]}. If the vector space, X, admits a norm, ‖ · ‖,
‖ · ‖tf = maxt∈[0,tf ] ‖s(t)‖, is its induced norm over SXtf .
Signal Temporal Logic: Signal Temporal Logic is a lan-
guage by which rich, time-varying system behavior can
be succinctly expressed. This language is based on atomic
propositions, Φ ∈ A, which are boolean valued variables
dependent on system behavior:
Φ(x) = True ⇐⇒ x ∈ JΦK = {x ∈ Rn | b(x) ∼ µ}. (1)
Here, A is the set of all atomic propositions, Φ(x) denotes
the truth evaluation of Φ at the state, x, b : Rn → R, µ ∈ R,
and ∼ = {≥,≤, <,>} [17]–[19]. Additionally, A is closed
under logical combinations of its components, i.e.:
Φ ∈ A =⇒ ¬Φ ∈ A, (2)
Φ1,Φ2 ∈ A =⇒ Φ1 ∧ Φ2 ∈ A and Φ1 ∨ Φ2 ∈ A. (3)
Here, ¬ denotes negation, ∧ denotes conjunction (and), and
∨ denotes disjunction (or). System specifications, ψ, can be
defined as follows:
ψ , True |Φ|¬ψ|ψ1 ∨ ψ2|ψ1 ∧ ψ2|ψ1 Uψ2, (4)
where, ψ1, ψ2 are specifications themselves [20]. Finally, S
is the set of all STL specifications, i.e. ψ ∈ S [20].
When a signal, s : R+ → Rn, satisfies a specification, ψ,
by some time, t i.e. ensures ψ = True, we write s(t) |= ψ.
Here, |= is termed the satisfaction relation, and it is defined
as follows:
s(t) |= Φ ⇐⇒ Φ(s(t)) = True, (5)
s(t) |= ¬ψ ⇐⇒ ψ(s(tf )) = False, (6)
s(t) |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 ⇐⇒ s(t) |= ψ1 ∨ s(t) |= ψ2, (7)
s(t) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ⇐⇒ s(t) |= ψ1 ∧ s(t) |= ψ2, (8)
s(t) |= ψ1 Uψ2 ⇐⇒ ∃ t∗ ≤ t s. t. (9)
(s(t′) |= ψ1 ∀ t′ < t∗) ∧ (s(t∗) |= ψ2) . (10)
Finally, for any signal temporal logic specification, ψ, eval-
uated over some bounded time-frame, [0, t], there exists a
robustness measure, ρ, with which to measure proximity to
satisfaction of the specification [17]:
ρ : SRnt → R s. t. ρ(s) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ s(t) |= ψ. (11)
Bayesian Optimization: Mathematically, Bayesian Opti-
mization is a solution procedure intended to solve optimiza-
tion problems of the following form:
x∗ = argmin
x∈A⊆Rd
c(x), (12)
where, typically, d is small; c(x) is expensive to evaluate
and lacks nice, analytic structure e.g. convexity; and A is
some set for which membership evaluation is simple e.g. a
hyperrectangle [21].
Abstractly, the procedure follows two, main steps, (for a
more comprehensive mathematical treatment, please refer-
ence [22]). The first step fits a Gaussian Process to c based on
a data-set of sampled values, DN = {(xk, yk = c(xk)}Nk=1
and a set of parameters, θ. The second step finds the next,
sample point via optimizing an acquisition function - in
our case, the Expected Improvement function. Usually, the
parameters θ are updated after each cycle; however, the
convergence results of [22] require a static parameterization.
Therefore, we opt for a static parameterization.
B. Problem Setup
We consider an uncertain control system as follows:
x˙ = f(x, u, d, w), (13)
where the state x ∈ X ⊆ Rn, the control input, u ∈ U ⊆
Rm, the environmental configuration, d ∈ D ⊆ Rp, and the
disturbance, w ∼ pienv, for the unknown distribution, pienv.
For this system, we also have a controller,
U : Rn × Rp → U ⊆ Rn, s. t. u(t) = U(x(t), d). (14)
Our goal is to certify that the above controller, U , which is
designed based on a nominal model,
x˙ = fˆ(x, u, d), (15)
satisfies a specification, ψ, to some minimum probability, for
all environment configurations, d ∈ D, when in closed-loop
with the unknown, uncertain system (13).
For the true and nominal systems from (13) and (15), we
define a simulation trajectory, φˆ(·), and the actual system
trajectory it approximates, φ(·), as follows:
φˆ(x0, u(t), d, t) = x0 +
∫ t
0
fˆ(x(s), u(s), d)ds,
φ(x0, u(t), d, w(t), t) = x0 +
∫ t
0
f(x(s), u(s), d, w(s))ds.
As stated, both φ(x0, u(t), d, w(t)) and φˆ(x0, u(t), d) are
signals, under the assumption that neither system ever en-
genders state values that tend to infinity.
As the simulation model (15) is deterministic, it may
be different from the true system (13). Therefore, we in-
troduce the following function to quantify the difference
between solutions to the nominal, closed loop system,
φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, t), and the true, closed loop system,
φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t), t):
∆φ(x0, U, d, w, t) (17)
= φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t), t)− φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, t),
where w(t) ∈ Wt is a random signal where, w(t) ∼
pienv ∀ t ∈ [0, tf ], and Wtf is the set of all random
signals over the bounded time-frame, [0, tf ]. Equation (17)
permits us to define the accuracy of our nominal closed loop
system (14)-(15), over bounded time-frames, [0, tf ]:
Definition 1. The nominal closed loop system (14)-(15) is
(, tf , λ, ‖ · ‖)-accurate, if and only if
Pw
[
max
0≤t≤tf
‖∆φ(x0, U, d, w(t), t)‖ ≤ 
]
≥ 1− λ, (18)
∀ d ∈ D where ∆φ(x0, U, d, w) is defined in (17).
We require a notion of accuracy for our nominal model, as
we will first certify that the nominal closed loop system (14)-
(15) satisfies the specification, ψ, for all environmental
configurations, d ∈ D. If the nominal closed loop system
indeed satisfies ψ, then, provided that ψ meets the criteria
for the following assumption, we will extend that certificate
to the actual system, with some minimum probability:
Assumption 1. The specification, ψ, is of the form, ψ =
True U Φ or ψ = ¬(True U¬Φ), where Φ ∈ A.
In effect then, our problem statement is as follows.
Problem Statement. For a specification, ψ, satisfying the
criteria for Assumption 1, identify the minimum probability
by which the true closed loop system (13)-(14) satisfies ψ
by some final time, tf , i.e. determine p where,
Pw [φ (x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t), tf ) |= ψ] ≥ p, ∀ d ∈ D,
(19)
III. MAIN RESULT
This section is divided into two parts. First, we state and
prove the main result. Then, we show under which conditions
the assumption from our main result are satisfied.
A. Statement of Main Result
When a system’s operational specification, ψ, satisfies
the criteria for Assumption 1, and the controller (14) is
designed based on the nominal model (15), we devise a
method to lower bound the probability by which the true
closed loop system (13)-(14) satisfies ψ, for all environmen-
tal configurations. We do so by first assuming that there
always exists a Lipschitz robustness measure, ρ : SRntf →
R, for specifications, ψ, satisfying Assumption 1 (we will
prove that such a Lipschitz measure always exists for these
specifications, in Section III-B). Then, we define a nominal,
worst-case robustness value, h∗, for this robustness measure,
ρ, and the nominal closed loop system (14)-(15):
h∗ = min
d∈D
ρ(φˆ(x0, u(t), d)). (20)
Finally, our result indicates that if h∗ is both positive and
sufficiently far from zero, then the true closed loop sys-
tem (13)-(14) is guaranteed to satisfy ψ to the same minimum
probability defined by our simulator 1.
Theorem 1. Let ψ be a specification satisfying Assumption 1
with an (L, ‖ · ‖tf , | · |)-Lipschitz continuous robustness
measure, ρ : SRntf → R as defined in (11). If the nominal
system (14)-(15) is (, tf , λ, ‖ · ‖)-accurate, and the nominal
worst-case robustness, h∗ ≥ L, then the true system (13)-
(14) satisfies ψ with at least probability 1 − λ, ∀ d ∈ D,
i.e.
Pw [φ (x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t), tf ) |= ψ] ≥ 1− λ, ∀ d ∈ D .
Theorem 1 states that if the nominal system robustly
satisfies ψ, h∗ ≥ L, and is (, tf , λ, ‖·‖)-accurate, then with
probability greater than 1 − λ, the true system will satisfy
the same specification, ψ, as well.
Proof: We start by showing that if h∗ ≥ 0, then,
φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, tf ) |= ψ ∀ d ∈ D . (21)
This stems directly, as h∗ is defined as the minimum value
of the robustness measure, ρ, over all environmental config-
urations, d ∈ D. More formally, we have that
h∗ ≥ 0 =⇒ ρ(φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d)) ≥ 0, ∀ d ∈ D, (22)
≡ φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, tf ) |= ψ ∀ d ∈ D . (23)
Similar to equation (20), were we to define the true worst-
case robustness measure, H∗, for the true system (13)-(14)
and some w(t) ∈ Wtf ,
H∗ = min
d∈D
ρ(φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t))), (24)
then if H∗ ≥ 0, the true closed loop system (13)-(14), is
guaranteed to satisfy ψ, ∀ d ∈ D and this, specific w(t).
The remainder of the proof uses h∗ to lower bound H∗ for
all possible w(t) ∈ Wtf to at least some minimum proba-
bility. To simplify notation in its presentation, we abbreviate
φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d) = φ¯ and φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t)) = φ˜:
h∗ −H∗ = min
d∈D
ρ(φ¯)−min
d∈D
ρ(φ˜), (25)
= max
d∈D
−ρ(φ˜)−max
d∈D
−ρ(φ¯), (26)
≤ max
d∈D
∣∣ρ(φ˜)− ρ(φ¯)∣∣, (27)
≤ Lmax
d∈D
max
0≤t≤tf
‖φ˜(t)− φ¯(t)‖, (28)
≤ L with at least probability 1− λ. (29)
Note that the second to last line is valid ∀ w(t) ∈ Wtf .
The transition to the last line arises as the nominal system is
(, tf , λ, ‖ · ‖)-accurate. Furthermore, this probability is over
the random signals, w(t) ∈ Wtf , which is why the random
signal, w(t), does not appear in the last line. Hence,
h∗ ≥ L =⇒ Pw[H∗ ≥ 0] ≥ 1− λ ∀ d ∈ D, (30)
≡ Pw
[
φ˜(tf ) |= ψ
]
≥ 1− λ ∀ d ∈ D, (31)
where we abbreviate φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t)) = φ˜.
B. Extension of Main Result
Theorem 1 assumes existence of an (L, ‖ · ‖tf , | · |)-
Lipschitz continuous robustness measure, ρ, for specifica-
tions, ψ, satisfying Assumption 1. While this seems restric-
tive, the following three propositions show that such a Lips-
chitz robustness measure, ρ, always exists for specifications,
ψ, satisfying Assumption 1.
The first proposition develops a Lipschitz continuous func-
tion, h, with which to measure satisfaction of any predicate,
Φ ∈ A:
Proposition 1. Let Φ ∈ A. For some norm, ‖ · ‖ on Rn,
there exists an (L, ‖ · ‖, | · |)-Lipschitz function, h : Rn → R,
such that h(x) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Φ(x) = True.
Proof: For Φ = True, any constant, positive function h
suffices e.g. h(x) = 1; likewise, for Φ = False, any constant,
negative function h suffices. It remains to show the same
result for each Φ ∈ A\{True,False}. Here, we note that as
Φ 6= True,False, its associated truth region, JΦK, has a non-
trivial boundary, i.e. ∂JΦK 6= ∅. As a result, we can define
a signed, distance function, h,
l(x) = min
y∈∂JΦK ‖x− y‖, h(x) =
{
l(x) x ∈ JΦK,
−l(x) x ∈ J¬ΦK.
By definition, h is positive if and only if Φ = True. Also,
h carries the same Lipschitz constant, L = 1, as the set-
distance function, l, thus completing the proof.
Similar to Proposition 1, the second proposition develops
a Lipschitz robustness measure, ρ, for any specification, ψ,
that satisfies Assumption 1:
Proposition 2. Let ψ be a specification that satisfies Assump-
tion 1, with Φ ∈ A. Assume that there exists an (L, ‖·‖, | · |)-
Lipschitz function, h, such that h(x) ≥ 0 if and only if
Φ(x) = True. Then for ψ, there also exists an (L, ‖·‖tf , |·|)-
Lipschitz robustness measure, ρ : SRntf → R, as in (11), i.e.,
|ρ(s′)−ρ(s)| ≤ L max
0≤t≤tf
‖s′(t)−s(t)‖ = L‖s′−s‖tf . (32)
Proof: It is known from prior works, e.g. [17], that the
following are valid robustness measures for specifications, ψ,
satisfying Assumption 1, as h(x) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Φ(x) = True:
ρ(s) =
 max0≤t≤tf h(s(t)), If ψ = True U Φ,min
0≤t≤tf
h(s(t)), If ψ = ¬(True U¬Φ).
We will show that the first measure is Lipschitz.
|ρ(s′)− ρ(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ max0≤t≤tf h(s′(t))− max0≤t≤tf h(s(t))
∣∣∣∣ , (33)
≤ max
0≤t≤tf
|h(s′(t))− h(s(t))| , (34)
≤ L max
0≤t≤tf
‖s′(t)− s(t)‖. (35)
Following a similar chain of logic shows that the second
measure is Lipschitz, thus completing the proof.
Fig. 2. A picture of the (bottom) ROS-based simulation environment we
used to approximate our (top) true, Segway system.
Finally, Propositions 1 and 2 ensure that there always
exists a Lipschitz continuous robustness measure, ρ, for any
specification, ψ, satisfying the conditions for Assumption 1.
Proposition 3. For any specification, ψ, that satisfies As-
sumption 1, there always exists a Lipschitz continuous ro-
bustness measure, ρ, of the form in (11).
Proof: The proof is a direct application of Propositions 1
and 2. Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of at least
one (L, ‖ · ‖, | · |)-Lipschitz function, h, for Φ ∈ A, L ∈
R+, and norm, ‖ · ‖, on Rn. Using this function, h, in
the associated robustness measure, ρ, for ψ, as specified
in Proposition 2, guarantees the existence of at least one
Lipschitz robustness measure.
As a result, Proposition 3 indicates that, for any specifi-
cation, ψ, that satisfies Assumption 1, there always exists a
Lipschitz continuous robustness measure, ρ. As a result, if
the nominal system is (, tf , λ, ‖ · ‖)-accurate, with respect
to the same norm, ‖ · ‖, that induces the norm for which ρ
is Lipschitz, ‖ · ‖tf , the results of Theorem 1 still hold.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Our goal is to verify that a Nonlinear MPC controller,
designed to steer a Segway to a goal while avoiding ob-
stacles, satisfies a safety specification, ψ, incumbent on the
Segway. This verification question arose when, under normal
operation, this controller appeared to successfully steer the
Segway to the goal while also satisfying ψ. Hence, we
want to use Theorem 1, to verify that this controller always
satisfies ψ, regardless of the goals provided to the Segway.
The experimental setup and accompanying simulation, for
this verification procedure, is shown in Figure 2.
T = 0 sec
Goal, G1 = (4,5)
T ≈ 6 sec
Goal, G2 = (1,2)
θ ≈ 0.6 rad
Fig. 3. Shown above is the Segway operating with an example en-
vironmental configuration, d = [4, 5, 1, 2, 4.885]T . Each vector, d =
[G1, G2, T ]T ∈ R5 denotes the first goal cell to which the Segway is to
navigate, G1 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}2, the second goal cell, G2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}2,
and the time, T ∈ [0, 10], the Segway is to switch between going to G1
and going to G2. The example shown is a worst-case configuration, the
experimental trajectory for which is shown, in red, in Figure 6.
To use Theorem 1 for this verification, we require a
feasible space of environmental configurations, D. As we
are trying to verify the controller’s capacity to satisfy ψ
regardless of the goals provided to it, we specify a vector,
d ∈ D ⊂ R5, to be a vector of two goals, G1, G2, and
a switching time, T . This time, T , determines when the
Segway switches from navigating to the first goal, G1, to
navigating to the second goal, G2. Goals are represented as
shaded, cellular regions, as in the green region in Figure 2.
Hence, G1, G2 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}2 are cells in this 5× 5 grid,
and the switching time, T ∈ [0, 10]. Figure 3 portrays a
graphical representation of the Segway undergoing a spe-
cific environmental configuration, and the full, mathematical
setup is:
x = [x, y, θ, ψ, v, θ˙, ψ˙] ∈ R7, d = [G1, G2, T ]T ∈ D ⊂ R5,JΦK = {θ ∈ R | |θ| ≤ 0.7 rad}, ψ = ¬(True U¬Φ).
Given the above environment and safety specification, ψ,
the measurement function h and the robustness measure are
defined as:
h(x) = 0.7− |θ|, (36)
ρ(φ¯) = min
0≤t≤tf
h(φ¯(t)). (37)
Here, we abbreviate φˆ(x0, U(x(t), d), d) = φ¯. With this
setup, Theorem 1 requires the parameters, , tf , and λ,
for our ROS-based simulator, and the nominal worst-case
robustness h∗ as in (20), for the robustness measure (37).
To determine the parameters for our simulator, we note
that our measurement function (36) is (1, ‖·‖α, |·|)-Lipschitz
with respect to the norm,
‖x‖α =
7∑
i=1
αix
2
i , αi =
{
1 If i = 3
10−6 Else.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Bayesian Optimization Sampling Iterations
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
ρ
Bayesian Scheme Convergence
Bayesian Optimization estimate
h∗ = 0.225
Fig. 4. Shown above is the convergence of the Bayesian-Testing framework,
minimizing the robustness measure, ρ, stated in Section IV, over the ROS-
based simulation of our Segway. Notice that by 125 iterations, the Bayesian
optimization estimate converged to h∗ = 0.225.
Hence, robustness measure (37) is also (1, ‖ · ‖tfα , | · |)-
Lipschitz. As Theorem 1 requires that our simulator be
accurate with respect to the same norm, ‖ · ‖α, that induces
the norm over which ρ is Lipschitz, ‖ · ‖tfα , we determined
the accuracy of our simulator with respect to this norm,
‖ ·‖α. To do so, we recorded the maximum simulation error,
∆ = max0≤t≤tf ‖∆φ(x0, U, d, w(t), t)‖α (17), for N = 300
different pairs of simulation and system trajectories, wherein
the starting, goal, and obstacle locations were the same for
each pair. The recorded data is shown in Figure 5. Here, we
inherently assume that the maximum norm deviance, ∆, is a
random variable distributed by some unknown distribution,
pi∆. As we do not have access to pi∆, we construct a
Monte-Carlo based estimate probability distribution, piN∆ .
This distribution, piN∆ , is known to be an unbiased estimator
of pi∆, for which the absolute value of the difference in
variance of the two probability measures is bounded above by
1
N . Based on this estimate distribution, pi
N
∆ , our data indicates
that our ROS-based simulator is ( = 0.125, tf = 10, λ =
0.05, ‖·‖α)-accurate, as P[∆ ≤  = 0.125] ≥ (1−λ = 0.95).
It remains to determine, for this simulator, the nominal
worst-case robustness measure, h∗, defined in equation (20),
with respect to the robustness measure (37). To solve opti-
mization problem (20), we used the Bayesian optimization
scheme detailed in [22], which was proven to converge in
expectation. Figure 4 shows the convergence results of this
algorithm, when run for 300 iterations, in attempting to solve
optimization problem (20). By roughly 125 iterations, the
algorithm had converged to an h∗ = 0.225, which, based on
the convergence results of this algorithm in [22], we assume
to be the solution to optimization problem (20). Furthermore,
this h∗ arose for the environmental configuration, d = [G1 =
(4, 5), G2 = (1, 2), T = 4.885]
T .
As a result, Theorem 1 indicates that, as (h∗ = 0.225) ≥
(L = 0.125),
Pw
[
φ˜(tf ) |= ψ
]
≥ 0.95 ∀ d ∈ D . (38)
Here, we abbreviated φ(x0, U(x(t), d), d, w(t)) = φ˜. To
check the accuracy of this probabilistic claim, seven, in-
dependent runs of the Segway undergoing this worst-case
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
∆
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
Histogram of ∆ = max
0≤t≤tf
‖∆φ(x0, U, d, w(t), t)‖α
Fig. 5. Shown above is a histogram of the sampled, upper-bound on angular
trajectory deviation, ∆, with respect to the norm, ‖ · ‖α. The dashed, black
line indicates the cutoff  value,  = 0.125, for which P[∆ ≤ ] ≥ 0.95.
environment configuration, d = [4, 5, 1, 2, 4.885], are shown
in Figure 6. The probabilistic verification claim (38) indicates
that, with probability at least 0.95, experimental trajectories
should satisfy ψ, as they should all lie within the laven-
der box - and they indeed all lie within that box. For a
video summarizing this paper, in addition to experimental
demosntrations, please reference [1].
V. CONCLUSION
Our main contribution extends prior work done in the
Bayesian testing community, by describing a method to lower
bound the probability by which a system will satisfy an
operational specification in practice. Our method constructs
a probabilistic signal tube around a simulation trajectory, in
which we anticipate the real system trajectory to lie, with
some minimum probability. Then, we determine the worst-
case robustness measure for this nominal system, which, in
conjunction with the signal tube, we use to lower bound the
worst case robustness measure for the true system. If this
lower bound is positive, the controller is verified to satisfy
its specification, with the same minimum probability.
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